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A repeat of the earlier vote
rigging was highly unlikely
Expectations of Yushchenko victory in
the second runoff on 26 December 2004
are being confirmed. According to
preliminary data, he was 8% ahead of
Viktor Yanukovych. Mr. Yushchenko’s
victory was confirmed by exitpolls after
the third round. The fact that the
national TV channels are not significantly
censored any more and have started to
provide more objective information about
political events has been very positive for
Mr. Yushchenko.
Given that campaign conditions have
changed, it was very unlikely that the
vote will be rigged in favor of 
Mr. Yanukovych once more. First of all, he
lost the support of many of the top
politicians and officials who worked for
him before the “Orange Revolution.”
Secondly, even if most members of
election commissions and representatives
of the administration who were
implicated in voterigging kept their
positions, many of them were not willing
to risk committing a second crime. This
was reinforced by the active position
taken by millions of Ukrainians who
demonstrated during the “Orange
Revolution” that they were ready and
able to defend a democratic election.
There is a risk that many voters from the
east and south of Ukraine will not accept
Mr. Yushchenko. After two years of biased
coverage of Mr. Yushchenko on the
national television channels, they are
convinced that he is an ultra nationalist
manipulated by the West.
A new majority will work with
Mr. Yushchenko
According to ICPS, after the election, a
new majority will quickly be formed in the
Rada, and it will completely or largely
support the policies of President
Yushchenko. This majority will likely
include Nasha Ukraina, the Yulia
Tymoshenko Bloc, National Agrarian Party,
NationalDemocratic Party, and the Party
of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs
factions. The Socialist faction will also
probably join the new majority. It is likely
that a large number of deputies who were
members of proKuchma factions—
SDPU(o), Trudova Ukraina, Yedyna Ukraina,
Soyuz, and Democratic Initiatives—prior
to the “Orange Revolution” will join it.
The new Government will most probably
be formed out of these political forces,
and the premiership will go to one of
them. If the new president effectively
uses his powers, he will remain a key
player in Ukrainian politics.
ICPS analysts also expect democratic and
market reforms to pick up speed in mid
2005, once the shortterm negative impact
of the election is overcome. The recent
Constitutional reform in effect has
strengthened the powers of all elected
bodies: councils of all levels, as well as the
heads of cities, towns and villages. The role
of independent media will grow as new
investors come into the market and
competition grows. This will make it
possible to dramatically reduce the level of
corruption and government interference in
economic processes.
President Yushchenko and the various
parties in the legislature will want to
demonstrate their effectiveness in the run
up to the 2006 Verkhovna Rada elections.
Thus, ICPS anticipates radical reform in the
policymaking process, a continuation of
tax reform, the reform of the social security
system, and serious efforts at reforming the
regulatory and residential services systems.
Ukraine will become a center for
promulgating democracy
According to ICPS analysts, the Head of
State, the legislature and the Government
will work to develop economic relations
with both the European Union and
Russia. The most likely goal will be to set
up a Free Trade Area with both economic
partners and attracting their investors.
The Government will probably speed up
the process of acceding to the WTO.
Nevertheless, foreign policy will be clearly
oriented towards joining the EU. Contacts
between Kyiv and Brussels will be much
more proactive and productive than
contacts with Moscow, whose influence
over Ukraine’s domestic and foreign policy
will be considerably weaker. Ukraine will
either leave the CEA project with Russia,
Belarus and Kazakhstan, or it will insist
that it be transformed into an FTA.
The new Ukrainian administration will try
to set up good political relations with the
US. Mr. Yushchenko will most likely have
to keep his election promise and withdraw
Ukrainian troops from Iraq. Still, for
Washington Kyiv’s new role as a center for
promulgating democratic and market
concepts among CIS countries, in
particular Moldova, Belarus and Russia,
will be more important. 
For additional information, contact 
Daria Hlushchenko by telephone at 
(380)44) 236)4477 or via e)mail at
dgluschenko@icps.kiev.ua.
Predictions that Viktor Yushchenko would win the presidential election in Ukraine
are coming true. Despite amendments to the Constitution that restrict his powers
as president, he will continue to have significant influence. Mr. Yushchenko will be
able to quickly form a new Verkhovna Rada majority and a Government based on
that majority. ICPS experts expect market and democratic reforms to accelerate in
2005. This should improve conditions for business and investment, which will make
it possible to maintain a high pace of economic growth. Economic relations with
both the European Union and Russia will continue to evolve. At the same time,
Moscow’s influence over the political situation in Ukraine will noticeably decline
and political relations with the EU will become more active
Democratic and market reforms will
accelerate after a Yushchenko victory
®
Despite numerous statements by
politicians, the deepening political crisis
after the runoff of the presidential
election did not turn into an economic
one. The consumer market did not see
any shortages, prices grew less in
November than in October, and the
hryvnia saw no devaluation in the official
exchange rate. According to ICPS
estimates, the economic impact of a
radical political struggle, threats of
separatism and ineffective action on the
part of the government administration
will be no more than 0.5% of annual GDP.
At the same time, the economic slow
down that accompanied the political
crisis has actually eased the risk of
overheating that began to grow over the
summer.
ICPS economists have downgraded their
forecast for economic growth in 2004
from 13.5% to 12% in real terms, because
inflation has grown to 12% and because
of the radicalized political confrontation.
Economic growth has been driven by
rising exported goods and services (34%),
which surpassed growth in imports (22%)
as well as growth in gross consumption
(12.6%). Significantly higher exports
than imports will make it possible for
Ukraine to post a recordhigh current
account balance, above 10% of GDP
according to ICPS estimates.
In 2005, the economy should continue to
slow down, with real GDP growth dropping
to 7%. At the same time, investment is
likely to grow faster than GDP, which
could spur the economy to post 7.5%
growth in 2006, even in the face of a
slight but persistent trend towards
deteriorating global commodity markets. 
Macrofinancial situation should
gradually improve. ICPS expects a gradual
shrinking of the Budget deficit, from 3%
of GDP in 2004 to 1% of GDP in 2006.
Budget expenditures should stabilize at
29% of GDP during the forecast period.
Budget revenues are likely to grow due to
the removal of tax breaks and moderate
movement out of the shadow economy
into the formal one. Any fiscal gap
should not lead to new arrears in social
payments, thanks to the availability of
financial resources. Once more,
privatization and international
borrowings will be the key sources for
financing the deficit. 
Inflation should inch down to 11% in
2005 and drop to 6% in 2006. At the
same time, ICPS expects high consumer
inflation (up to 15–16% yearonyear) in
H1’05 due to a continuing trend of
growing food prices, seasonal hikes in
petroleum product prices, and the
likelihood that the Government will raise
regulated rates, a decision that was
postponed in 2004 as political poison.
Transit fares and utility rates are likely to
grow the most. 
In 2005–2006, imports are expected to
grow faster than exports, although
current account and trade balances will
remain rather high. Maintaining these
trends will allow for considerable forex
inflows once the election is over, and 
for gold and forex reserves to be
replenished. Thus, NBU will be able to
continue to support a stable UAH/USD
exchange rate and even to start
moderate nominal revaluation in light 
of continuing dollar depreciation around
the world. 
ICPS has published its quarterly forecasts
for economic development in Ukraine since
1997 in the Quarterly Predictions journal.
To subscribe, contact Andriy Starynskiy by
phone at (380)44) 236)4477 or via e)mail
at marketing@icps.kiev.ua. You can also
order the publication on)line at
http://www.icps.kiev.ua/eng/subscribe/.
For additional information, contact 
Andriy Blinov by telephone at 
(380)44) 236)4477 or via e)mail at
ablinov@icps.kiev.ua.
The presidential election has increased the drag on economic growth in Ukraine.
Nevertheless, 2004 was another year of record1high economic growth, which
ICPS expects to settle at 12%. Losses from the political crisis are expected to be
worth no more than 0.5% of GDP. High inflation and a slight deterioration in
world commodity markets in 2005 should dampen real GDP growth to 7% for
the year. In 2006, the economy is likely to pick up again due to lower inflation
and lively investment
The political crisis will not turn into 
an economic one: 20052006 forecast
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Table 1. Key indicators
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006
Indicator (  f  o  r  e  c  a  s  t  )
GDP, billions UAH 264.2 346.2 418.5 472.4
Real GDP, apc* 9.4 12.0 7.0 7.5
Real industrial output, apc 15.8 13.0 9.5 8.0
Real agricultural output, apc 9.9 17.0 2.0 2.5
Real gross fixed investment, apc 15.8 11.0 10.0 12.0
Real consumption, apc 12.8 12.6 7.7 9.3
Consumer price index, apc 8.2 12.0 11.0 6.0
Real wages, aapc** 24.0 23.0 18.0 15.0
Unemployment rate 
(ILO methodology), % 9.1 8.5 8.2 8.0
Exports of goods&services, apc 24.0 34.0 10.0 7.0
Imports of goods&services, apc 28.7 22.0 16.0 13.0
Current account balance, % GDP 5.8 10.4 7.1 3.9
Consolidated Budget balance, % GDP 0.2 3.0 2.5 1.0
Official exchange rate 
(average annual), UAH/USD 5.33 5.32 5.29 5.22
* apc = annual percentage change    ** aapc = average annual percentage change
Source: Derzhkomstat, National Bank of Ukraine, Ministry of Finance; 
calculations and forecast by Quarterly Predictions.
